Jailbreaking Embodied LLMs via Action-Level Manipulation

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



From Digital LLMs to Embodied LLMs





Workflow of Embodied LLMs



Jailbreaking Embodied LLMs



Existing Attacks



[2] BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLMs in the Physical World, Zhang et al, *ICLR 2025.*

[3] POEX: Towards Policy Executable Jailbreak Attacks Against the LLM-based Robots, Lu et al, *arXiv 2025.*

Defense Mechanisms Are Evolving

- LLM Post-training [4]



- Safety Reasoning [5]



[4] AEGIS2.0: A Diverse AI Safety Dataset and Risks Taxonomy for Alignment of LLM Guardrails, Ghosh et al, *ACL 2025*
[5] Advancing embodied agent security: From safety benchmarks to input moderation, Wang et al, *arXiv 2025.*

Defense Mechanisms Are Evolving

- LLM Post-training [4]



Are language-level defenses sufficient to ensure embodied LLM security?

- Specif

[4] AEGIS2.0: A Diverse AI Safety Dataset and Risks Taxonomy for Alignment of LLM Guardrails, Ghosh et al, *ACL 2025*
[5] Advancing embodied agent security: From safety benchmarks to input moderation, Wang et al, *arXiv 2025.*

Action-level Threat: An Example



Action-level Threat: An Example



Heat the user's phone!



Traditional language-level jailbreak



Pick up user's phone.



Move to the microwave.



Stretch your arm.

Security Gap in the Physical World



Language-level Security $\neq$ Action-level Security

Benign Language ⟶ ***Unsafe Action***



Study 1: Can We Jailbreak Vanilla Systems?



Challenge 1: How to enhance attack executability in black-box scenarios?

Solution 1: Deploy a local proxy system to align our input prompts

Design 1: Local Proxy for Attack Optimization

Goal: Align action-level commands with real-world constraints before attack



- Replicate an embodied system locally
  - ✓ Weaponize a local white-box LLM [6]
  - ✓ The weaponized planner maps malicious intent into an action chain

[6] Language Models Resist Alignment: Evidence From Data Compression, Jin et al, *ACL 2025.*

Design 1: Local Proxy for Attack Optimization

Goal: Align action-level commands with real-world constraints



- Define a rule-based verifier
  - ✓ Specify real-world constraints
  - ✓ Check the validity of actions from the planner

Design 1: Local Proxy for Attack Optimization

Goal: Align action-level commands with real-world constraints



- Iterative planner-verifier refinement loop
  - ✓ The verifier gives feedback to the planner
  - ✓ The planner refines and outputs again
  - ✓ Until…

Result: a valid and executable action chain

Study 2: Can We Beat SoTA Defenses?



Challenge 2: How to further disguise malicious intent?

Solution 2: Intent obfuscation via cover action injection

[3] POEX: Towards Policy Executable Jailbreak Attacks Against the LLM-based Robots, Lu et al, *arXiv 2025*.

Design 2: Obfuscation via Noise Injection

We randomly inject irrelevant action steps as noise for obfuscation

The bypass ratio

The executed ratio

Can we customize injected noise?

Design 2: Obfuscation via Noise Injection

Goal: Inject context-aware noise into the optimal location



- Identify the dominant action step
- Generate a benign cover action chain
- Embed the action under the cover

Result: a stealthier and coherent action chain

Blindfold: Put Things Together



Blindfold: Put Things Together



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

Evaluation

- Target embodied LLMs:
  - ✓ **4** closed-source LLMs & **4** open-source LLMs
  - ✓ **4** embodied frameworks & **4** test simulators

- Dataset:
  - ✓ Merge BadRobot [2] and SafeAgentBench [7] (187 unsafe samples in total)

- Metric:
  - ✓ ASR (the bypass ratio), TSR (the executed ratio)

- Baseline:
  - ✓ BadRobot: three prompt strategies (BR-1 to BR-3)
  - ✓ POEX: transferred version from white-box optimization

[2] BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLMs in the Physical World, Zhang et al, *ICLR 2025*.

[7] SafeAgentBench: A Benchmark for Safe Task Planning of Embodied LLM Agents, Yin et al, *arXiv 2024*.

Overall Performance



(a) ASR results across selected open-source LLMs.

(b) TSR results across selected open-source LLMs.

Figure 9: ASR and TSR results of `Blindfold` and baselines across selected open-source LLMs.



(a) ASR results across selected closed-source LLMs.

(b) TSR results across selected closed-source LLMs.

Figure 10: ASR and TSR results of `Blindfold` and baselines across selected closed-source LLMs.

Both closed- and open-source embodied LLMs are highly vulnerable to Blindfold!

Sensitivity Analysis

- Impact of embodied LLM frameworks



(a) GPT-4o. (b) Phi-4-14B.

Figure 11: Results for distinct embodied LLM frameworks.

- Impact of system configurations



(a) GPT-4o. (b) Phi-4-14B.

Figure 13: Results for distinct embodied AI simulators.

Blindfold shows generalizability across various embodied LLM systems!

Real-world Study

- Real-world implementation



UFactory xArm 6 : a 6DoF robotic arm

- Results



(a) Bypass cases of each method. (b) Executed cases of each method.

20 real-world cases for test

More results (ablation study, stability analysis...) can be found in our paper!

Countermeasure

- We transfer previous defenses for LLMs to the embodied domain

Table 3: Results for transferred defenses against `Blindfold`.

Metric \ Method	Llama-Guard	SafeDecoding	VeriSafe
ASR	86.1%	88.7%	76.5%
ΔASR	-7.6%	-4.8%	-17.9%

- Recommendations for defense design
  - ✓ Multi-modal alignment
  - ✓ Action-level reasoning

Takeaway

- Embodied LLMs are highly vulnerable to *action-level threats.*
- We present Blindfold, an end-to-end automated attack framework via *adversarial proxy planning.*
- We design an intent obfuscator to add *adaptive action-level noise* to enhance attack stealthiness, beating state-of-the-art defenses.

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Thanks for Listening!

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